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Abstract
The Atlantic sea scallop fisheries in the U.S. and Canadian o≠shore waters provide a natural experiment in fisheries management regimes. Starting in 1986, in side by side areas
of George’s Bank, Canada adopted a rights-based approach while the U.S. continued
with effort controls. Analysis of their experiences shows that the resource has been better maintained in Canada with lower fishing e≠ort, that the Canadian fishing industry
has become more prosperous and innovative relative to that in the U.S., and that the
Canadian co-management regime is more cooperative. These results suggest that systematic evaluation of actual experience with rights-based fishery management
regimes is needed as the basis for policymaking.
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foreword
James Gustave Speth
Dean, Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies
Many signiﬁcant ﬁsheries in the United States and around the world are over-exploited,
with harvests at unsustainable levels and resource stocks far beneath their economic or
biological potential. Some ﬁsheries have collapsed, with uncertain recovery prospects.
Many more ﬁsheries are now generating much less income for ﬁshermen, coastal communities, and national economies than they could be, because of excessive and inefﬁcient ﬁshing patterns and excessive destruction of by-catch and ﬁshing habitats.
These problems are not matters of serious debate. What to do about them, however,
is highly contentious. The merits of different ﬁshery management approaches are
debated within the halls of industry, within ﬁshery management councils, in
legislatures, and in the courts. Ideology, interest, and insecurity intensify these disputes.
What is often missing, unfortunately, is a factual record of experience with different
ﬁshery management regimes in practice. The lack of systematic evaluation of actual
experience opens the way for unsupported and often distorted predictions and allows
misperceptions to persist unchallenged. The lack of adequate analyses of actual
experience, at a minimum, makes rational deliberation more difﬁcult, and, at worst,
can stymie much-needed efforts to bring about improvements in ﬂawed management
systems.
This paper by Robert Repetto, Professor in the Practice of Economics and
Sustainable Development at Yale’s School of Forestry & Environmental Studies, compares the long-run experience of the Atlantic sea scallop ﬁsheries in the U.S. and
Canada, which have operated under two different management regimes for ﬁfteen
years. Canada operates a ﬂexible harvest quota system, while the U.S. maintains effort
controls. The two ﬁsheries operate side by side on the George’s Bank, using similar
gear, but have experienced strikingly different results, which this paper documents for
the ﬁrst time.
This report continues the long-standing tradition of the School of Forestry &
Environmental Studies of promoting research that provides the knowledge base for
sustainable management of natural resources. It also marks a new initiative at the
School, namely, making research that is timely and policy relevant available in easily
accessible working paper formats published quickly. If you would like to respond to
the author of this paper, or obtain more copies, please avail yourself of the contact
information on the inside front cover. We hope that this working paper, and others to
follow, will stimulate comment and discussion, and will contribute, ultimately, to
improved conditions for people and environments in the United States and around
the world.
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Most commercial ﬁsheries in the United States suffer from over-ﬁshing, inefﬁcient
harvesting, or both (National Marine Fisheries Service 2000). As a result, hundreds of
millions of dollars in potential income are lost to the ﬁshing industry, ﬁshing communities, and the general economy (Mitchell 1998). Prices to consumers and seafood
import quantities are higher than they would be if U.S. ﬁsheries were managed more
successfully. In addition to these economic losses, excessive ﬁshing effort has resulted
in higher rates of unintentional by-catch mortality of non-targeted ﬁsh, seabirds, and
marine mammals and more ecological damage than necessary to benthic organisms
from trawls, dredges, and other ﬁshing gear (National Research Council 1999b).
These documented losses underscore the nation’s failure to manage its ﬁsheries
efﬁciently or sustainably. The fundamental problems stemming from open access to
ﬁshing resources have been addressed through a wide variety of regulatory controls
over entry, effort, gear, ﬁshing seasons and locations, size and catch. Yet, the
Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996 emphasized the continuing need to stop over-ﬁshing
and to rebuild stocks. How best to achieve this turnaround is unclear. In the management councils of speciﬁc ﬁsheries, there sometimes is bitter debate about the course
of action.
Particularly contentious are management regimes based on the allocation of rights
over portions of the total allowable catch to eligible participants in a ﬁshery — socalled rights-based ﬁshing management systems. Best known among rights-based
regimes are Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) systems, in which individual license
holders in a ﬁshery are assigned fractions of the total allowable catch (TAC) adopted
by the ﬁshery managers. These quotas are transferable among license holders by sale
or lease.
Proponents of such systems argue that they promote conservative harvesting by
assuring quota holders of a share of any increase in future harvests achieved through
stock rebuilding. Proponents argue that such systems also promote efﬁciency by
allowing quota holders ﬂexibility in the timing and manner of harvesting their share
to reduce costs or to increase product value. Proponents also contend that ITQ systems reduce excessive effort by providing a compensated exit strategy for license holders in overcrowded ﬁsheries, and stimulate technological progress by increasing the
returns to license holders of investments in research or improved ﬁshing technology.
Opponents of ITQ regimes argue that such systems lead to monopolization of the
resource through consolidation, force out small operators, encourage discard of bycatch and high-grading of the resource to maximize the value of quota, and exacerbate
problems of enforcement (Jennings 1999).

Opinion on the merits of rights-based management regimes is divided among ﬁshermen, ﬁsheries managers, politicians, academics, and environmentalists. Within a
single ﬁshery, some operators strongly favor shifting to a rights-based regime and
other operators strongly oppose such a move. Among academic experts, economists
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generally favor the adoption of such systems for their promise of greater efﬁciency
and stronger conservation incentives, but other social scientists decry the potential
disruption of ﬁshing communities by market processes and the attrition of ﬁshing
jobs and livelihoods. Some environmental groups, notably Environmental Defense,
advocate rights-based ﬁsheries management as consistent with their model of marketfriendly environmentalism. Others, notably Greenpeace, argue vehemently against it.
These divisions are reﬂected in the political arena. The U.S. Senate, responding to constituent concerns in some ﬁshing states, used the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act to
impose a moratorium on the development of ITQ systems by any Fisheries
Management Council and on the approval of any ITQ system by the National Marine
Fisheries Service. A recent committee report from the National Research Council,
Sharing the Fish, which attempted to examine these controversies, generated only a
carefully balanced exposition of pros and cons, although the committee did recommend that Congress rescind its moratorium (National Research Council 1999a).
Despite support from some senators, the recommendation has not been adopted and
the moratorium has recently been extended.
Partly because these controversies have blocked adoption of rights-based systems,
there is very little actual experience with ITQ regimes on which to base positive or
negative judgements. Only three U.S. marine ﬁsheries operate under such regimes: the
mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog ﬁshery, the Alaskan halibut and sableﬁsh
ﬁshery, and the South Atlantic wreckﬁsh ﬁshery. In all three, there are too few years of
data from which to draw ﬁrm conclusions regarding the long-term consequences.
Some other ﬁshing nations, notably Iceland and New Zealand, use rights-based
regimes to manage nearly all their commercial ﬁsheries. Still others, such as Canada
and Australia, use such regimes in quite a few of their ﬁsheries.
However, there has never been an evaluation of actual experience of all ITQ systems
worldwide, using up-to-date data and an adequate, comparable assessment
methodology.

Because so little evidence is available, debate continues in a speculative, but heated,
fashion about the possible positive and negative effects of adopting ITQ systems. Too
little information exists to resolve these disagreements and to allow an informed
debate about whether the expected effects are consistent with U.S. ﬁsheries management objectives.
This lack of deﬁnitive information makes it imperative to study carefully all available experience that sheds light on the likely consequences of adopting rights-based
ﬁshing regimes. Fortunately, a rare naturally occurring experiment in the U.S. and
Canadian Atlantic sea scallop ﬁsheries provides such an opportunity. Fifteen years ago
Canada adopted a rights-based system in its o›shore sea scallop ﬁshery while the U.S.
continued to manage its scallop ﬁshery with a mix of minimum harvest size and maximum effort controls. A side-by-side comparison of the evolution of the commercial
scallop ﬁshery and of the scallop resource in the U.S. and Canada illuminates the consequences of these two very different approaches to ﬁsheries management.
      

 

The Atlantic sea scallop ﬁshery is especially suitable to such a comparison. Scallops
are not migratory. After dispersing widely on ocean currents for about a month in the
larval stage, juvenile scallops settle to the bottom. If they strike favorable bottom conditions, they remain relatively sedentary thereafter while growing rapidly. The ﬁshing
technology is quite uniform in both countries: a high percentage of the scallop harvest is caught in dredges towed along the bottom. The recreational ﬁshery is negligible. Both Canada and the United States draw most of their harvest from the George’s
Bank, across which the International Court of Justice drew a boundary line in 1984
separating the exclusive ﬁshing grounds of the two countries. This ended the competitive ﬁshing of George’s Bank by United States and Canadian vessels, which had
devastated the resource in the disputed areas in the previous years. Finally, though
some Canadians might disagree, there are not large differences in the cultural backgrounds, legal traditions, or ﬁshing histories of the two countries. All these similarities enhance the value of the comparison of U.S. and Canadian sea scallop ﬁsheries as
a natural experiment in ﬁsheries management.
Scallops make an interesting case study for other reasons as well. The ﬁshery has
consistently been among the top ten in the United States in the value of landings. After
they are ﬁrst recruited into the ﬁshery at about age three, scallops quadruple in size by
age ﬁve, so harvesting scallops at the optimal age brings large rewards. Spawning
potential also increases substantially over these years — scallops four years old or older
contribute approximately 85% to each year’s enormous fecundity, which can allow
stocks to rebound fairly quickly when ﬁshing pressure is reduced. At the same time,
high rates of natural mortality and the variability of weather and currents during the
larval stage introduce a large random ﬂuctuation into annual stocks of new juvenile
scallops. This phenomenon puts a premium on accurate assessment of upcoming year
classes and prudent management to stabilize biomass in the face of ﬂuctuating
recruitment.
The U.S. and Canadian scallop ﬁsheries have been compared by collecting biological and economic data pertaining to each one for periods before and after the
Canadians adopted rights-based ﬁshing in 1986 1. This quantitative information was
enriched through interviews carried out in Nova Scotia and in New England during
the summer of 2000 with ﬁshing captains, boat owners, ﬁsheries scientists and managers, consultants and activists involved with the scallop ﬁsheries in the two countries.
The questions that are most important to address in this comparison of alternative
ﬁshery management regimes are:
G
G
G
G

What has happened to the scallop resource in Canadian and U.S. waters?
What has happened to the commercial ﬁshery and to its people?
What other ecological impacts have resulted?
What have been the effects on the management regime itself, including
advances in the application of scientiﬁc knowledge and the achievement of
cooperation among participants, managers and other stakeholders?

The unusual natural experiment that has played out on George’s Bank provides a
rare opportunity to answer these questions.
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The quantitative data
sources underlying figures
and tables are listed in the
references at the end of the
paper. For the United States
fishery, these sources
include: National Marine
Fisheries Service (1996,1997);
New England Fisheries
Management Council (1993,
1998, 1999, 2000a, 2000b);
and Rago, Lai, and Correia
(1997). For the Canadian fishery, data sources include:
Brander and Burke (1994);
Robert (2000); Govt. of
Canada, Dept. of Fisheries
and Oceans (1997, 1999a,
1999b, 2000); as well as additional data made available by
the Department of Fisheries
and Oceans.
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the evolution of the u.s. and canadian
management regimes
The U.S. System

2

3

Growth over-fishing means
harvesting the scallops too
young and too small, sacrificing high rates of potential
growth. Recruitment overfishing means harvesting
them to such an extent that
stocks are reduced well
below maximum economic
or biological yield because
the reproductive potential is
impaired.
Two small areas in the
mid-Atlantic region were
subsequently closed to
protect juvenile scallops.

The Atlantic sea scallop ﬁshery extends from the Gulf of Maine to the mid-Atlantic.
The National Marine Fisheries Service has managed all but the Gulf of Maine stocks
as a single unit. From 1982 through 1993 the principal management tool in place was
an average “meat count” restriction, which prescribed the maximum number of scallop “meats” that could comprise a pound of harvested and shucked scallops. Since
scallops are shucked at sea and packed in ice for the remaining voyage, this restriction
encouraged the practice of allowing the shucked scallops to soak excessively in ice
water, taking on some weight but losing ﬂavor. In any case, this approach was inadequate to prevent either recruitment or growth over-ﬁshing. 2 Entry into the scallop
ﬁshery remained open. Fishing effort ﬂuctuated with the abundance of the new
recruits but remained too large to sustain ﬁshermen’s incomes or the scallop resource.
Limited entry was introduced through a moratorium on the issuance of new
licenses in March 1994.
After applicants were qualified and appeals settled, more than 350 license holders
remained, including just about anyone who could document any significant scallop
catch in the preceding years. This many licenses were estimated at the time to exceed
the capacity consistent with stock rebuilding by about 33% (Edwards 1999).

Restrictions that still remain were introduced on the transferability of licenses: licenses
could be transferred only through sale or transfer of the vessel to which it was attached,
and a license could not be disengaged from its vessel and “stacked” with other licenses
on another vessel. This measure impeded consolidation of the ﬁshery and took on
greater signiﬁcance when limits were put on the amount of days any license holder
could be at sea ﬁshing scallops.
Because of excessive capacity, additional measures to control ﬁshing effort were also
adopted. The allowable days at sea were scheduled to drop from 200 in the initial year
to 120 in 2000, which was estimated to be barely enough to allow a full-time vessel to
recover its ﬁxed costs, under normal operating conditions (Edwards 1999). A maximum crew size of seven was adopted, an important limitation since shucking scallops
at sea is very labor-intensive. Minimum diameters were prescribed for the rings on
scallop dredges to allow small scallops to escape and minimum size restrictions were
retained. In other words, the U.S. adopted a system of stringent effort controls, to be
enforced through compulsory monitoring and enforcement.
In December 1994, another signiﬁcant event for scallop ﬁshermen occurred: three
areas of the George’s Bank were closed to all ﬁshing vessels capable of catching cod or
other groundﬁsh, a measure necessitated by the collapse of the groundﬁsh stocks.
Scallop dredges were included in this ban, cutting the ﬁshery o› from an estimated
ﬁve million pounds of annual harvest and shifting ﬁshing effort dramatically to the
mid-Atlantic region and other open areas. 3 These area closures created a second U.S.based natural experiment within the broader natural experiment. Area closures pro      

 

vided evidence in subsequent years about the potential of scallop stocks to rebound
when ﬁshing pressure was removed. This has generated signiﬁcant new ideas about
managing the U.S. scallop ﬁshery, which will be discussed later on.
The U.S. scallop ﬁshery was also strongly affected by provisions in the Sustainable
Fisheries Act of 1996, which required ﬁsheries management to develop plans to eliminate over-ﬁshing and to restore stocks to a level that would produce the Maximum
Sustainable Yield (MSY). Since scallop stocks were estimated to be only one-third to
one-fourth that size, these provisions mandated a drastic reduction in ﬁshing effort.
The plan adopted in 1998 provided that allowable days at sea would fall from 120 to as
little as 51 over three years, a level that would be economically disastrous for the scallop
fishery.

In response, the Fisheries Survival Fund, an industry group, formed to lobby for
access to scallops in the closed areas, a relief measure that was opposed by some
groundﬁsh interests, lobstermen, and environmentalists. Industry-funded sample
surveys found that stocks in the closed areas had increased 8 to 16-fold after four years
of respite. On this evidence, direct lobbying to the federal government secured permission for limited harvesting of scallops in one of the closed areas of George’s Bank
in 1999. Abundant yields of large scallops were found. In the following year, limited
harvesting in all three closed areas of George’s Bank was permitted. This rebuilding of
the stock, together with strong recruitment years, revived the fortunes of the industry
and made it unnecessary to reduce allowed days at sea beneath 120 days per year, since
average ﬁshing mortality on the larger stocks became consistent with rebuilding targets. Today, all the effort controls on U.S. scallop ﬁshermen remain. In addition, they
are subject to additional limitations on days they can use ﬁshing in the closed areas
and catch limits on each allowable trip. These additional restrictions are intended to
prevent them from quickly depleting the rebuilt stocks in those areas.
The Canadian System

Canada, which harvests a much smaller scallop area, introduced limited entry as far
back as 1973, conﬁrming 77 licenses. The only additional management tool was an
average size restriction. During the next decade of competitive ﬁshing with the U.S.
ﬂeet, stocks were depleted, incomes were reduced, and many Canadian owner operators voluntarily joined together in ﬁshing corporations. This resulted in considerable
consolidation, so that by 1984 there were only a dozen companies ﬁshing for scallops,
most of them operating several boats and holding multiple licenses.
In 1982 an enterprise allocation system was introduced in the Canadian groundﬁsh
ﬁshery. In an enterprise allocation system, portions of the catch are awarded not to
individual vessels but to operating companies, which can then harvest their quota
largely as they think best. Since many of the scallop license holders also held groundﬁsh licenses, they had an opportunity to learn from this experience. One lesson was the
folly of lobbying the ﬁsheries management agency for too large a total allowable catch,
an error that contributed to the collapse of Canadian groundﬁsh stocks.
      

7

8

    

In 1984, after the adjudication of the Hague Line, the Canadian o›shore operators
began to develop a similar enterprise allocation (EA) system for the scallop ﬁshery.
The government supported this effort, accepting responsibility for setting the TAC
with industry advice but insisting that the license holders work out for themselves the
initial quota allocation. After almost a year of hard bargaining, initial allocations were
settled, based largely on each license holders’ historical catch. Allocations were awarded to nine enterprises in the form of percentages of the annual total allowable catch.
Restrictions were adopted on quota transfers. Permanent transfers are allowable only
if the entire enterprise changes hands and if the ministry approves. Temporary transfers of quota within a ﬁshing season are limited to no more than 25% of a quota and
also require government approval. Despite these restrictions, the government has
approved a sale of quota in parts, allowing new entry and temporary transfers of
quota also to take place.
Also in 1986, to support this system, the government achieved a separation of the
inshore and o›shore scallop ﬁsheries, demarcating ﬁshing boundaries between the
two ﬂeets. From 1986 to 1989, the inshore scallop harvest rose several-fold as the result
of an unprecedented recruitment bloom ﬁrst observed in the Bay of Fundy in 1986,
and the number of active vessels doubled. Most of the increased effort stemmed from
operators holding dual groundﬁsh and scallop licenses, who concentrated on the scallop bonanza, and from double-crewing to ﬁsh round the clock (Brander and Burke
1994). Some of the captains and crews who were displaced from the o›shore ﬁshery
entered the inshore scallop ﬁshery.
Why Did the Two Regimes Diverge?

The two nations adopted different management regimes for their similar scallop ﬁsheries for several reasons. The Canadian ﬁshery was much smaller and had already
undergone considerable consolidation into ﬁshing enterprises by the mid-1980s.
There were fewer than twelve companies involved in the negotiations over the initial
quota allocation. All these enterprises were located in Nova Scotia, where the ﬁshing
community is relatively small and close-knit, with a history going back centuries. By
contrast, the U.S. ﬁshery was much larger, comprising more than two hundred active
vessels operating from ports spread from Virginia to Maine. When limited entry was
introduced, more than 350 licensees resulted and the industry consistently rejected
measures that would facilitate consolidation, such as license transferability or license
“stacking.”
The numbers and geographical dispersion of U.S. scallop fishermen would have made the
negotiation of a rights-based system difficult, particularly the initial allocation of quotas.

In fact, though it had been suggested as an appropriate option in the 1992 National
ITQ Study (Sutinen et al. 1992), the ITQ option was rejected early in the development
of Amendment 4 on the grounds that negotiating initial allocations would take too
long (Edwards 1999). There were also fears that an ITQ system would lead to excessive
concentration within the ﬁshery.
      

 

Moreover, Atlantic Canada had already started moving in the direction of rightsbased ﬁshing with an experimental system for groundﬁsh. By contrast, this approach
was strongly opposed in all New England ﬁsheries, where the tradition of open public access to ﬁshing grounds has been extremely strong. Various effort and size restrictions were preferable in New England to restrictions on who could ﬁsh. The management goals in the U.S. ﬁshery seem to be to maintain as many livelihoods in the ﬁshery as possible and to share fairly the resulting ﬁnancial pain.

sustainable harvesting: what has happened to the
resources?
Interviews in Canada reveal that a strong consensus has emerged among quota holders,
the workers’ union, and ﬁsheries managers in favor of a conservative approach to setting
the overall catch limit. Stability in the harvest is preferred to boom and bust
ﬂuctuations in the ﬁshery. In recent years the annual TAC has been set to stabilize the
harvest in the face of ﬂuctuating recruitment in accordance with scientists’
recommendations. If sample surveys at sea detect weak incoming year classes, which
would lead to lower recruitment into the commercial ﬁshery two or three years later,
then the TAC is adjusted downward to conserve more of the existing harvestable stock
for later years. There is a clearly understood link between this year’s harvest and next
year’s availability.
This understanding has been fostered by the industry-ﬁnanced government
research program, which closely samples the abundance of scallops in various year
classes and analyzes the results to present the industry with an array of estimates relating the next year’s TAC to the consequent increase or decrease in harvestable biomass.
Faced with these choices, the Canadian industry has opted for conservative overall
quotas in the knowledge that each quota holder will proportionately capture the beneﬁts of conservation through higher catch limits in subsequent years. Internalizing the
returns to conservation decisions is one of the characteristics of rights-based ﬁshing
regimes.
As a result, as Figure 1 indicates, the Canadian ﬁshery has succeeded in rebuilding
the stock from the very low levels that were reached during the period of competitive
ﬁshing in the early 1980s. It has also succeeded in smoothing out ﬂuctuations in the
biomass of larger scallops in the face of large annual variations in the stock of new
three-year-old recruits in the 90-100mm size range.
In the United States, there has generally been opposition to measures requiring
effort reductions needed to rebuild stocks. Such measures were accepted only when
seen to be absolutely necessary. The effort controls adopted in 1994 were driven by the
need to reduce ﬁshing mortality by at least one-half to forestall drastic stock declines.
Those embodied in Amendment 7 to the Fisheries Management Plan in 1998 responded
to a requirement in the Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996 to eliminate over-ﬁshing and
to rebuild stocks to the level that would support the maximum sustainable yield. This
was estimated to require a three or four-fold stock increase. Amendment 7 engendered
a strong and successful industry lobbying effort to forestall the effort reductions by
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Figure 1 Estimated Biomass: Canadian George’s Bank

gaining access to the groundﬁsh closed areas. As a result of such resistance, as Figure 2
shows, resource abundance in the U.S. ﬁshery has ﬂuctuated more widely in response
to varying recruitment and a larger fraction of the overall resource consists of new
three-year-old recruits, because of heavy ﬁshing exploitation of larger, older scallops.
Figure 2 Abundance Indices, U.S. George’s Bank

      

 

Overall, because of its success in maintaining its scallop stock at a higher level, the
Canadian ﬁshery has maintained harvest levels with less ﬁshing pressure. The exploitation rate on scallops aged 4 to 7, which is the age class targeted in the Canadian ﬁshery,
has fallen from about 40% at the time the EA system was adopted to 20% or less in
recent years. Even more signiﬁcantly, the exploitation rate on 3-year-old scallops has
fallen almost to nil, as Figure 3 indicates. Industry participants state unanimously that
it makes no economic sense to harvest juvenile scallops because the rates of return on
a one or two year conservation investment are so high. Not only do scallops double and
redouble in size over that span but the price per pound also rises for larger scallops.
Reﬂecting that realization, the industry has supplemented the ofﬁcial average meat
count restriction with a voluntary program limiting the number of very small scallops
(meat count 50 or above) that can be included in the average. Industry monitors check
compliance with this agreement. However, there is no incentive to violate it because
license holders know that because of the EA system they and they alone reap the returns
of this conservation investment.
Figure 3 Exploitation Rates, Canadian George’s Bank

In the United States, the exploitation rates have been much higher. Exploitation rates
on larger scallops rose throughout the period 1985-1994, peaking above 80% in 1993.
Only the respite of the closed areas gave the stock some opportunity to rebuild in subsequent years. Exploitation pressures have also been heavy on 3-year-old scallops
despite the heavy economic losses this “growth over-ﬁshing” imposes. Exploitation rates
have consistently exceeded 20% and rose beyond 50% when effort expanded substantially during the early 1990s in response to one or two strong year classes (see Figure 4).
Because there is no assurance in the competitive U.S. fishery that fishermen acting to
conserve small scallops will be able to reap the subsequent rewards themselves, the
fleet has not exempted these undersized scallops from the harvest.
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Figure 4 Exploitation Rates: U.S. George’s Bank

In summary, under the EA system the Canadian ﬁshery has maintained the stock
at a higher level of abundance, closer to the levels consistent with the maximum biological and economic yields. The Canadian system has also been able to deter the premature harvesting of under-sized scallops and to avoid the heavy economic losses
such growth over-ﬁshing entails. By contrast, before the scallop grounds were closed
to harvesting, the U.S. ﬁshery management regime resulted in substantially higher
rates of exploitation, even on under-sized scallops, and led to lower levels of stockabundance, far below those consistent with optimum yield. The closure of substantial
parts of the resource area because of groundﬁsh restrictions allowed scallop stocks to
rebuild rapidly in those areas and in the last few years has permitted a limited harvest
of large scallops with lower overall ﬁshing mortality.

what has happened to the fishery?
Static Efficiency

It is notoriously difﬁcult to persuade ﬁshermen to report or to talk about how much
money they are making, but there are reasonably reliable indicators of their economic success. The ﬁrst is capacity utilization. An equipped ﬁshing vessel represents a considerable investment that is uneconomic when idle. Considerable excess capacity was
already present in the U.S. ﬂeet when license limitations were initiated in 1994. This
enabled the number of active vessels to expand and contract in response to stock ﬂuctuations. Some consolidation in the number of license holders has taken place because
those who exit the ﬁshery typically sell their license and boat to one of the larger ﬁshing enterprises. However, restrictions on license holders’ freedom to stack multiple
licenses onto a single vessel have prevented any signiﬁcant consolidation in the size of
the ﬂeet.
      

 

In Canada, there has been a steady and gradual reduction in the size of the ﬂeet.
When the EA system was introduced, license holders began replacing their old wooden
boats with fewer larger, more powerful vessels—thereby maintaining or increasing ﬁshing capacity. The stability afforded by the EA system reduced license holders’ investment
risk and enabled them to ﬁnance these investments readily. Overall, the number of
active vessels in the Canadian ﬁshery has already dropped from sixty-seven to twentyeight (see Figure 5). The process continues. Two Canadian companies are investing in
larger replacement vessels with on-board freezing plants in order to make longer trips
and freeze the ﬁrst-caught scallops immediately, thereby enhancing product quality.
Figure 5 Vessels Fishing

Trends in the number of days spent annually at sea are similar to those in the number of active vessels. In the United States, effort has risen and fallen in response to
recruitment and stock ﬂuctuations (see Figure 6).
Figure 6 Days at Sea
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In Canada, there has been a steady reduction in the number of days spent at sea,
reflecting the greater catching power of newer vessels, the greater abundance of scallops, and the increase in catch per tow. Consequently, the number of sea days per active
vessel, a measure of capacity utilization, has consistently been higher by a considerable
margin in Canada than in the United States (see Figure 7).
Figure 7 Sea-Days per Vessel

Because of the ﬂexibility afforded license holders, and their ability to plan rationally for
changes in capacity, the Canadian ﬁshery has been able to utilize its ﬁxed capital more
effectively. In the United States, restrictions on allowable days at sea, now at 120 days
per year, have impinged heavily on those operators who would have ﬁshed their vessels
more intensively.
A second important indicator of proﬁtability is the catch per day at sea. Operating
costs for fuel, ice, food, and crew rise linearly with the number of days spent at sea.
Therefore, the best indicator of a vessel’s operating margin is its catch per sea day. In
this indicator, the advantage of the Canadian scallop ﬂeet is striking. Catch per day at
sea has risen almost four-fold since the Enterprise Allocation system was adopted. On
the Canadian side, overall scallop abundance is greater and the cooperative survey
program has produced a more detailed knowledge of good scallop concentrations in
the patchy bottom conditions. Little effort is wasted in harvesting the TAC. Moreover,
ﬁshing has targeted larger scallops, producing a larger and more valuable yield per
tow. In the U.S. ﬁshery, catch per sea day fell signiﬁcantly over the same period
because of excessive effort, lower abundance, greater reliance on immature scallops,
and less detailed knowledge of resource conditions (see Figure 8).

      

 

Figure 8 Catch per Sea-day

As a result of these diverging trends, catch per sea-day in 1998 favored the Canadian
fleet by at least a seven-fold margin, though when the regimes diverged in 1986 the
margin was only about 70%.

The harvesting of large scallops in the U.S. closed area in 1999 helped only somewhat
to reduce this difference. An index of revenue per sea-day normalized to 1985 shows
the same trend (see Figure 9). It is clear that the Canadian ﬂeet has prospered and
until the recent opening of the closed areas, the U.S. ﬂeet has not.
Figure 9 Index of Revenue per Sea-day
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This conclusion is reinforced by estimates made by the National Marine
Fisheries Service economist Steven F. Edwards, based on an economic simulation model of the U.S. ﬁshery. His estimates suggest that average proﬁts per
full-time vessel fell steadily from more than $650,000 in 1977 to only about
$5,000 in 1992, and have been negative over the period 1993-1996, implying
that the average full-time scallop vessel was not covering its ﬁxed costs. Of
course, some of the more productive and efﬁcient ﬁshermen continued to
make money during this time but the ﬁshery as a whole had completely dissipated the potential resource rents (Edwards 1999).
Dynamic Efficiency

Striking as these comparisons may be, the differences in technological innovation in the two ﬁsheries are perhaps even more dramatic. The Canadian
industry has clearly recognized the value of investments in research. License
holders jointly and voluntarily ﬁnance the government’s research program
by providing a fully equipped research vessel and crew to take sample surveys. This has permitted the research scientists to take samples on a much
ﬁner sampling grid, resulting in a more detailed mapping of scallop concentrations by size and age. In addition, scallop vessels contribute data from
their vessel logs recording catch per tow, as well as Global Positioning System
records, to the research scientists, facilitating even better knowledge of scallop locations and abundance.
In the United States, the government-funded research program lacks the
resources to sample the much larger U.S. scallop area in the same detail. The
coarser sample grid has led industry to complain that scientists have underestimated scallop abundance by missing dense but small concentrations.
However, industry response has not been to ﬁnance government research, as
in Canada, but to initiate a parallel sampling program, especially to monitor
scallop abundance in the closed areas.
Recently, the Canadian industry has embarked on a new industryﬁnanced program costing several million dollars to map the bottom of its
scallop grounds using multi-beam sonar. This technique can distinguish
among sand, gravel, rocky, and other bottom conditions, thereby pinpointing the gravelly patches where scallops are likely to be found. Groundtruthing of this information with experimental tows has conﬁrmed that this
mapping can enable vessels to harvest scallops with much less wasted effort,
simply by towing where scallops are and not where they aren’t.
Industry informants predict that they will be able to harvest their quotas with
an additional 50% reduction in effort. Not only will this reduction in dredging
increase the fishery’s net rent considerably, it will also reduce by-catch of
groundfish, gear conflicts with other fisheries, and damage to the benthic
organisms on the George’s Bank.

      

 

All three side effects are of great ecological beneﬁt to other ﬁsheries and to the environmental community.
Equity Issues

Both the U.S. and Canadian ﬁsheries have traditionally operated on the “lay” system,
which divides the revenue from each trip among crew, captain, and owner according
to pre-set percentages, after subtracting certain operating expenses. In Canada, for
example, 60% of net revenues are divided among captain and crew and 40% goes to
the boat. For this reason, all parties remaining in the ﬁshery after its consolidation
have shared in its increasing rents.
In both countries as well, barriers to entry were erected at the time of license limitation or moratorium, not by the adoption of an EA system. When licenses were
awarded exclusively to boat owners, the decision was made to assign to the owners
whatever resource rents the ﬁshery might produce. In Canada, however, the government raised license fees in January 1996 from a nominal sum to $547.50 per ton of
quota, thereby recapturing some resource rents for the public sector.
Nonetheless, defenders of the present U.S. management regime uphold “a right to
ﬁsh,” maintaining that ﬁshing is a way of life and should be preserved. Interviews in New
Bedford and in Nova Scotia shed interesting light on this point of view. In Lunenburg
harbor, black granite obelisks stand in memorial to ﬁshermen lost at sea over the past
century. On them are inscribed the names of ﬁshermen lost over the decades. The same
family names recur and recur. Many of those same names—the Knickles, the
Himmelmans, and the Moshers, for example—are current owners of scallop licenses. Yet,
despite their heritage, the current generation of these families maintains that ﬁshing is a
way of making a living, not a way of life. They strongly defend the EA system. Similarly,
one of the largest New Bedford scallopers, a third generation ﬁsherman, explained that
his father had urged him to go to college and learn a profession rather than to become a
ﬁsherman. Though he didn’t follow that advice, he gives it to his own son. Like his counterparts in Canada, he sees ﬁshing as a business and favors adoption of a rights-based system.“Fishing as a way of life,” at the expense of an efﬁcient management regime, does not
command strong support even among long-time ﬁshing families.
Although survivors in the Canadian ﬁshery have done well, there has been a loss of
employment amounting to about 70 jobs per year over the past thirteen years (Govt.
of Canada, Dept. of Fisheries and Oceans, 1997). In the early years, many found berths
in the inshore scallop ﬁshery, which was enjoying an unusual recruitment bloom.
More recently, the expanding oil and gas industry in Nova Scotia and the service sector have absorbed these workers with little disruption or overall unemployment.
The Canadian union representing many of the scallop workers supports the Enterprise
Allocation system over a return to competitive fishing, favoring steady remunerative
jobs over a larger part-time or insecure workforce.

The union has negotiated full stafﬁng of crews, which comprise 17 workers in Canada
(compared to 7 in the U.S.), as well as preference for displaced crew members in ﬁlling onshore or replacement crew jobs.
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One fear expressed by U.S. ﬁshermen about the consequences of adopting a rightsbased regime is that small ﬁshermen will be forced out by larger concerns. Though exit
from a rights-based ﬁshery would be voluntary, the fear is that small ﬁshermen would
not be able to compete, perhaps because of economies of scale or because of ﬁnancial
constraints and would have to sell out. Canada’s experience provides some evidence
about the process of consolidation (see Table 1).
table 1
table 1

changes in quota holdings, 1985 –2000,
canadian offshore scallop fishery

company
name

percentage
of tac, 1986

percentage
of tac, 2000

Adams and Knickle, Ltd.

9.77

9.77

Comeau Seafoods, Ltd.

15.42

15.42

Fishery Products Int’l

16.77

16.77

Mersey Seafoods, Ltd.

7.00

7.00

Scotia Trawler Equipment Ltd.

16.32

16.32

McLeod Fisheries Ltd.

7.14

Pierce Fisheries Ltd.

13.43

L. Sweeney Fisheries Ltd.

13.49

Island Pride Fisheries

0.66

Clearwater Fine Foods Ltd
LaHave Seafoods Ltd.

31.06
3.66

Source: MPO-DFO, Govt. of Canada, Nova Scotia

Over a fourteen-year period, there has been some consolidation. The number of
quota holders has declined from nine to seven. Three medium to large quota holders
sold out to Clearwater Fine Foods Ltd., a privately owned company involved in harvesting, processing, and distributing scallops and other sea foods. Clearwater is now the
largest licensee, holding slightly less than a third of the total quota. The other entrant is
the smallest licensee, which bought a part of the quota held by an exiting company. The
remaining 65% of the quota remains in its original hands, including the shares held by
two of the smallest original quota holders.
There is little evidence in this record that the smaller players have been at a significant competitive disadvantage or that a rights-based regime results in monopolization of the fishery.

governance and co-management
Another important issue is the effect of the regime on the process of governance and the
success of co-management efforts. On this score, the Canadian record is clearly superior.
Industry cooperatively supports government and its own research programs. Owners and
operators speak respectfully about the scientists’ competence and have almost always
accepted their recommendations in recent years. The industry also bears the costs of
monitoring and enforcement of the EA regime and of its own voluntary restrictions on
harvesting under-aged scallops. Interviews reveal that ﬁshermen feel that the system has
      

 

freed them from disputes regarding allocations or effort restrictions and has enabled
them to concentrate on maximizing the value of their quotas through efﬁciencies and
enhanced product quality.
In the U.S. ﬁshery, the contrast is obvious. The industry created its own lobbying
organization, the Fishermen’s Survival Fund, to contest the decisions of the Fisheries
Management Council and the National Marine Fisheries Service in maintaining area
closures. The FSF has hired its own Washington lawyer and a lobbyist (a former member of Congress) to lobby Congress and the executive branch directly. It has hired its
own scientiﬁc consultants in order to contest the ﬁndings of government scientists, if
necessary, and is conducting its own abundance sampling. Fishermen in the industry
and their representatives are openly critical of government ﬁsheries managers and scientists and of one another. All informants complain about the time-consuming
debates and discussions about management changes. None could clearly explain the
decision process in the management regime — for example, what voting majority or
other consensus it would take to adopt a rights-based regime. The larger ﬁshermen
complained repeatedly that smaller ﬁshermen were motivated mainly by envy and
were using the political process to try to hold others back. Adding further to the conﬂict, environmental groups that had won a place on the Fisheries Management
Council, having failed to stop the Council’s decision to resume limited scallop ﬁshing
in the closed areas of George’s bank, have initiated a lawsuit to block the opening.
The “co-management” regime in the U.S. scallop fishery is conflicted, costly, and
ineffective.

prognosis
The Canadian scallop ﬁshery is prosperous and largely content with its rights-based
regime. Neither industry, nor government, nor unions desire to replace the EA system
with any other. Though the industry regards the restrictions on transferability as
anachronistic, there is little quota for sale in any case. The industry expects that its
investment in research will substantially raise efﬁciency and proﬁtability in the coming
years, even with a stable TAC. The industry’s investment in new freezer vessels will also
enhance product quality and the value of the catch by enabling the operators to freeze
ﬁrst-caught scallops and market fresh the scallops caught on the last days of the voyage.
The prognosis for the U.S. ﬁshery is less certain but more interesting. The natural
experiments with closed areas have demonstrated how quickly scallop stocks can
increase when ﬁshing pressure is relaxed (see Table 2). They have also raised suspicions that the larger biomass of mature scallops in the closed areas may be responsible for the good recruitment classes of recent years. This would suggest that the ﬁshery had been subject to recruitment over-ﬁshing as well as growth over-ﬁshing.
Developments in the closed areas have created substantial support both in the
Fishermen’s Survival Fund and in the National Marine Fisheries Service for adopting
a system of rotational harvesting, in which roughly 20% of the scallop grounds would
be opened in rotation in each year. Rotational harvesting would largely eliminate
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growth over-ﬁshing by giving under-sized scallops in closed areas a chance to mature.
This would improve yields in the ﬁshery but would not resolve the problem of excessive effort. Rotational harvesting would also raise new management challenges in
enforcing the closures and adjusting them with insufﬁcient data on ﬂuctuating geographical scallop concentrations.

table 2 scallop abundance in closed and open
table 2 areas: u.s. scallop grounds, 1997 –2000
survey biomass/tow (kg)

1997

1998

U.S. George’s Bank closed areas

2.5

7.1

1999 2000
6.3

13.2

U.S. George’s Bank open areas

0.6

0.8

1.1

3.0

Mid-Atlantic closed areas

0.8

2.9

6.3

9.2

Mid-Atlantic open areas

0.5

0.7

1.5

2.3

Source: NE Fisheries Management Council, Scallop Plan Development
Team, 2000 Scallop Fishery Management Plan SAFE Report (Stock
Assessment and Fishery Evaluation), Gloucester, Mass. Sept. 8, 2000.

Adopting a rotational harvesting regime would also lead toward a catch quota system. Already, limits on the number of trips each vessel may take into the closed areas
and catch limits per trip amount to implicit vessel quotas on harvests in the closed
areas. These would be formalized in a rotational harvesting plan. Then, perhaps, it
might be only a matter of time before the advantages of ﬂexible harvesting of quota
and transfers of quotas are realized. Cross-hauls by the New England and MidAtlantic ﬂeets to harvest quota in the others’ respective regions would make little
sense. Consequently, it seems quite possible that over the coming years the U.S. scallop ﬁshery will move toward and ﬁnally adopt a rights-based regime, putting itself in
a position to realize some of the economic beneﬁts that the Canadian industry has
enjoyed for the past decade.

conclusions
Much can be learned from experience. The Hague Line across the George’s Bank separating the U.S. and Canadian ﬁsheries should be as well known as the 38th parallel
separating North and South Korea. Across both lines, contrasting economic regimes
have brought spectacularly different results, prosperity for some and economic
decline for others. However, before this paper there has been little discussion in the
United States of the Canadian experience, relevant though it is. Other countries with
rights-based ﬁsheries regimes, such as Iceland and New Zealand, have also registered
successes. In fact, no ﬁshery that has adopted a rights-based regime has ever reversed
the decision. There is a pressing need for a thorough evaluation of experience with
these approaches throughout the world, using adequate assessment methodologies
and up-to-date data, in order to provide U.S. ﬁshermen and ﬁsheries policy makers a
more adequate basis for choice.

      

 

This study inevitably provokes the question whether or not commercial ﬁshery
resources should be managed efﬁciently like a business dedicated to producing as
much sustainable income as possible.
If the current U.S. scallop fishery were a business, its management would surely be
ﬁred, because its revenues could readily be increased by at least 50% while its costs
were being reduced by an equal percentage. No private sector manager could survive
with this degree of inefficiency.

If ﬁsheries are to be managed in the public interest, what party should be held
accountable for this waste of resources and sacriﬁce of potential economic beneﬁts—
the Congress, NMFS, or the industry? In particular, why should the Congress impose
and maintain a ban on the development of rights-based ﬁshing regimes even in those
ﬁsheries in which participants favor them?
Alternatively, should ﬁsheries be managed to protect a way of life, to keep as many
ﬁshermen on the water as possible? If so, why should public resources be devoted to
this goal? To what extent, if any, should other economic and ecological values be subordinated to this goal? Why should ﬁshermen be protected in this way, when loggers,
miners, and hunters are not and the vast majority of the workforce is answerable to
the marketplace for its employment? The comparison of the U.S. and Canadian systems raises fundamental questions about the proper objectives of ﬁsheries management and about the tools for achieving them.
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